Memory for Distant Past Events in Chimpanzees and Orangutans  by Martin-Ordas, Gema et al.
Memory for Distant Past EveCurrent Biology 23, 1438–1441, August 5, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.06.017Report
nts
in Chimpanzees and OrangutansGema Martin-Ordas,1,* Dorthe Berntsen,1 and Josep Call2
1Center on Autobiographical Memory Research,
Aarhus University, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
2Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology,
Deutscher Platz, 6, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
Summary
Determining the memory systems that support nonhuman
animals’ capacity to remember distant past events is
currently the focus an intense research effort and a lively
debate [1–3]. Comparative psychology has largely adopted
Tulving’s framework by focusing on whether animals
remember what-where-when something happened (i.e.,
episodic-like memory) [4–6]. However, apes have also been
reported to recall other episodic components [7] after sin-
gle-trial exposures [8, 9]. Using a new experimental para-
digm we show that chimpanzees and orangutans recalled a
tool-finding event that happened four times 3 years earlier
(experiment 1) and a tool-finding unique event that
happened once 2 weeks earlier (experiment 2). Subjects
were able to distinguish these events from other tool-finding
events, which indicates binding of relevant temporal-spatial
components. Like in human involuntary autobiographical
memory, a cued, associative retrieval process triggered
apes’ memories: when presented with a particular setup,
subjects instantaneously remembered not only where to
search for the tools (experiment 1), but also the location of
the tool seen only once (experiment 2). The complex nature
of the events retrieved, the unexpected and fast retrieval, the
long retention intervals involved, and the detection of bind-
ing strongly suggest that chimpanzees and orangutans’
memories for past events mirror some of the features of
human autobiographical memory.
Results and Discussion
In Remembrance of Things Past, Marcel Proust [10] described
how the unique taste of a petite madeleine dipped in lime tea
spontaneously brought to his mind a childhood memory of
visiting his aunt Leonie in the mornings and always being
offered a madeleine dipped in lime tea. This example nicely
illustrates that the activation of autobiographical memories
[11–13] can be cue dependent [14] and serves to frame our
research question. Although some authors emphasize the
aspect of conscious experience of the self (i.e., autonoetic
awareness) in autobiographical memory [11, 13], our study
does not address this aspect because this feature cannot be
measured in nonhuman animals. Thus, the main goal of exper-
iment 1 was to investigate whether, like in Proust’s example,
chimpanzees’ and orangutans’ memories for a complex
remote event (i.e., problem solving situation) could be trig-
gered by relevant cues in terms of distinctly overlapping fea-
tures of the past event. Three years prior to the present study,
apes were exposed to a task composed of two events: apes*Correspondence: ordas@psy.au.dkobserved an experimenter hiding two different tools in two
locations, one tool in each location (tool-hiding event), and
later they were presented with an out-of-reach food task
(task-presentation event) (Figure 1 and Figure S1 available
online). In order to successfully obtain the reward, apes had
to remember the location where the useful tool was hidden,
go retrieve it, and use it. Note that chimpanzees and orangu-
tans are proficient at using tools to obtain out-of-reach
rewards [15–18]. Autobiographical memory research makes
a distinction between general and unique events. Whereas
unique events refer to events specific in time and place (e.g.,
your first talk at a conference), general events are considered
to be summaries of similar repeated events or events extended
in time (e.g., what you normally do and experience when you
give talks at conferences) [19, 20]. Since the event that we
are testing here took place four times for a particular task
(i.e., platform task) and for a particular set of tools (i.e., length
condition) (see the Experimental Procedures), we refer to it as
a general event.
Research on autobiographical memory has also shown that
memories for past events can happen strategically through
goal-directed retrieval or involuntarily through associative
cueing (henceforth, cued recall). The latter is normally trig-
gered by features of the context present at retrieval, which
match distinctive features of the memory [14]. Thus, in order
to activate a memory, a cue is needed that is sufficiently
distinct to discriminate a past event from alternatives through
association. In our experiment, the unique combination of the
rooms where subjects were tested, the experimental setup,
and the experimenter provided a unique feature overlap with
a past event and thus a highly discriminable cue. This is so
because subjects had been tested in the exact same location,
with the exact same setup, and with the same experimenter as
3 years earlier. However, in order for this cue combination to
activate the relevant memory, subjects had to be able to
bind these elements together and ignore a number of irrelevant
associative links. Note that the experimenter has tested the
apes in other tasks (e.g., tool use, object choice paradigms)
and that the rooms are used on daily basis to test the apes
by other experimenters in other experimental setups (e.g.,
cooperation tasks, tool-use tasks), and different experi-
menters in different experiments have used the present plat-
form task. Thus, individually, each cue had been previously
associated with other experimental contexts; only in combina-
tion did the features provide high discriminability (Figure 2).
We tested 15 chimpanzees and four orangutans (Table S1).
Subjects were distributed into two groups: an experimental
group (with previous experience in Martin-Ordas, Atance,
and Call’s experiment [21] and a control group (with no previ-
ous experience). Subjects only received one trial. We pre-
dicted that if the cues provided at retrieval triggered subjects’
memories for a general event (e.g., in this context tools used to
be hidden in locations A andB), apes in the experimental group
would search for the tool in those locations.
Our results showed that except for one subject (Pini), the
ten remaining subjects in the experimental group searched
for the tools in the boxes placed in locations A and B (binomial
test, p = 0.012) and none of the control subjects did so (Fisher’s
exact test, p < 0.001). Since apes did not witness the
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Figure 1. Experimental Setup
Setup for the experiment with the chimpanzees
(orangutans’ rooms consisted of only four com-
partments). Locations A and B represent the
locations where the boxes to hide the tools were
placed (experiment 1). Locations C and D repre-
sent the locations where the trays to hide the
tool was placed (experiment 2). Room 1 is the
roomwhere the task was placed, as well as where
the subjects were when experimenter gave them
access to the tool locations. See also Figures S1
and S2.
Distant Memories in Great Apes
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of the two tools was counterbalanced across the four trials,
they could not know where each tool was hidden. We found
that subjects’ responses varied depending on which tool
they found first (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.005). Four subjects
found the correct tool first and went directly to the platform
to use it. Six subjects found first the incorrect tool, rejected
it, immediately went to search for the other tool in the second
location, and used it. We also analyzed latency to find the
tools. Overall, subjects went to retrieve the tools within the first
5 s (median = 4.5; Q1 = 2; Q3 = 38.50), and none of the control
subjects did so after 5 min.
Experiment 1 established that chimpanzees and orangutans
recalled a general event that happened 3 years ago. However,
it still remains an open question whether apes can remember
tool-finding events that happened only once and distinguish
them from another similar tool-finding events. Experiment 2
examined this possibility by presenting 16 chimpanzees and
five orangutans with a unique tool-hiding event (see the Exper-
imental Procedures). Whereas half of the subjects (experi-
mental group) experienced the tool-hiding and task-presenta-
tion events once, the other half (control group) lacked such
experience. Two weeks later, all subjects were shown only
the task-presentation event. Similar to experiment 1, we pre-
dicted that if the cues provided at retrieval triggered subjects’
memories for a unique event, apes in the experimental group
would search for the tool in locations C or D (Figures 1
and S2). In addition, experiment 2 helped us to further investi-
gate the issue of binding. If apes encode the relation between
the elements of an event and form an integrated representa-
tion of the event, interrogating a memory for a distinctive
feature of the event (e.g., task) will activate the other features
(e.g., where to search for the tools). The binding between the
task and where to search for the tools would allow subjects
to discriminate between different episodes (i.e., experiment 1
and experiment 2) that share common features (e.g., the
location, experimenter). In order to test this possibility, we
controlled for subjects’ experience with the tool-finding event
in experiment 1 (Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
Nine out of ten subjects in the experimental group searched
and found the tools in the trays placed in locations C and D(binomial test, p = 0.021), and none of
the control subjects searched for the
tools (Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.001).
Seven out of the nine successful sub-
jects went to the correct location first
(binomial test, p = 0.180), and the other
two went to the empty location first,
then went to the second location, found
the tool, and used it. Having moreexperiencewith tasks involving tool searching (i.e., tool finding
general event in experiment 1) did not affect subjects’ perfor-
mance (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.400). Overall, experimental
subjectswent to retrieve the toolswithin the first 21 s (median =
21; Q1 = 10; Q3 = 28.50), and none of the control subjects did
so after 5 min. Thus, experiment 2 established that subjects
remembered a unique tool-hiding event that happened
2 weeks earlier when presented with the relevant cues.
Exploratory behavior cannot explain our results; otherwise,
control subjects would also have been able to find the tools
during the 5 min that the trials lasted. Additionally, successful
subjects went directly (without any exploration) to retrieve the
tools immediately after the experimenter gave them access
to the roomswhere the tools were hidden. Learning to respond
to a particular stimulus configuration without having any
recollection of the past event is also unlikely because the
experimenter, the task used in experiment 1, and the testing
rooms had been used in numerous other studies. Further-
more, subjects were exposed only four times (experiment 1)
and only once (experiment 2) to those particular stimuli
configurations.
The performance of those subjects who had experienced
the general event in experiment 1 but not the unique event in
experiment 2 is particularly revealing. Contrary to what one
would expect according to an explanation based on learning
to respond to a particular stimuli configuration, subjects
directed their searches toward neither the location where the
boxes used to be in experiment 1 nor the trays in experiment 2.
Likewise, experimental subjects with experience in both
experiments did not direct their searches toward both loca-
tions. One could still argue that since the two tasks used in
the present experiments required different tools, subjects
could have identified the tool they needed for each particular
task and then search their memory for the location where
such tool was found in the past. However, this explanation
does not account for the results from experiment 1 because
the same task had been used on several occasions in the
same room and the location of the tools varied with the exper-
imenter. Instead, our results suggest that subjects relied on a
binding of specific aspects (i.e., experimenter, tool location) of
two very similar tool-finding events in a way that allowed them
Figure 2. Schematic Representation of Previous
Use of the Platform Task
Illustration of some of the different experiments in
which the platform task has been used, the
different situations in which the tools have been
presented, and some of the experimenters that
have used this task. The solid line represents
the associative links that subjects had to make
in order to successfully search for the tools
when they saw the platform task in experiment 1.
The dotted lines represent the associations that
subjects had to disregard.
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regarded as a constituting component of autobiographical
memory in humans [22–24].
The present work differs in important ways of previous
studies of long-term memory in nonhuman animals. With
regard to the recall of past events [4–9, 25], there are three
important differences between previous studies and the cur-
rent one. First, previous research typically used delays of a
week maximum, whereas in our study apes remembered
events that happened 2weeks or 3 years earlier. Second, while
most of the previous research investigated the recall a series
of repeated unique events, we tested cued recall of a unique
and a general event. An important limitation of using repeated
trials is that at encoding, subjects could anticipate that they
would be tested later and, thus, encode the information
semantically [26]. We negated this possibility to our subjects
by assessing their memories unexpectedly, for a general
tool-finding event that occurred 3 years earlier. Third, in a
free-recall experiment, a chimpanzee remembered what (i.e.,
food) waswhere for periods of up to 16 hr [8]. While our results
are consistent with these findings, there are two important dif-
ferences between the two studies. First, in Menzel’s study, the
chimpanzee could have monitored the area in which the food
had been hidden but she could not retrieve the food during
the retention interval (RI). In contrast, if our subjects had
checked the target locations during theRIs (3 years or 2weeks,
depending of the experiment), they would have found no tools
there. This is important because it demonstrates that tool
retrieval in the memory assessment phases was based on
remembering the general or unique event. Second, our results
show that apes bound the information about the experimenter-
task-tool location and distinguished between similar tool-
finding events (Figure 2). This binding hypothesis was not
directly tested in Menzel’s study.
With regard to long-term retention [27–29], previous studies
have only addressed whether subjects have long-term reten-
tion for general rules that they may be able to apply in other
contexts besides the experimental context in which those
rules were acquired. Therefore, a successful response in these
experiments did not necessarily require remembering the ele-
ments of the context in which that particular task took place. In
contrast, in the current study subjects not only remembered
how to solve the problem, but also remembered contextual
elements. Thus, in order to succeed, subjects had to recall
elements of the context in which this particular cue constella-
tion was previously presented and differentiate it from other
situations that shared some of those same cues.In conclusion, this study investigated
the unexpected cued recall of general
and unique past, distant, and complexevents in chimpanzees and orangutans. The rapid and cue-
triggered recall of the tool-hiding event that took place weeks
or even years ago [30] suggests that our cue configuration
provided a high level of memory discriminability. Similarly,
when exposed to discriminable cues, humans involuntarily
remember autobiographical memories, and the retrieval time
for such involuntary memories is shorter than for strategically
retrieved events [14, 31]. It has been suggested, but never
addressed before, that this involuntary retrieval mode may
be present in nonhuman animals because it requires less
monitoring and thus fewer executive resources than those
involved in voluntary recall [14, 32, 33]. Finally, the appearance
of this type of memory in a tool-use task is consistent with the
idea that autobiographical memory may have originally
evolved to aid problem solving [34–36]. Taken together, these
results suggest that chimpanzees, orangutans, and humans
share some features of their memory systems for encoding
and recalling personal past events.
Experimental Procedures
Experiment 1
We tested 15 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and four orangutans (Pongo
abelii). We followed Martin-Ordas, Atance, and Call’s [21] experimental pro-
cedure, in which subjects were presented with two events (hiding tools and
task presentation) separated by a RI. The experimenter (E) presented a plat-
form task in room 1 (see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Then,
subjects remained in room 1 for 15 min, and after this time, subjects
observed the E hiding two tools in two boxes. To get the reward, subjects
had to recall the location of the correct tool. Subjects experienced this event
four times 3 years ago. In the present experiment, the E placed the tools in
the boxes before the subjects entered the testing rooms. Once subject
entered room 1, the E presented the platform task. After 5min, the E opened
the doors connecting room 1 with the boxes placed in locations A and B so
subjects could obtain the tools. Note that whereas in Martin-Ordas et al.’s
study [21], subjects experienced the hiding tools and task-presentation
events, in the current one, subjects only experienced the task-presentation
event. There were two groups defined by their participation in Martin-Ordas
et al.’s study: experimental group (n = 12) and control group (n = 7). See the
Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details.
Experiment 2
We tested 20 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and five orangutans (Pongo
abelii). There were two phases: encoding of the unique event and memory
assessment. Theencodingphaseconsistedof twoevents (task presentation
and hiding tool) separated by aRI of 2min. The E presented a seesaw task in
room 1. After a 2 min RI, subjects observed the E hiding a tool in one of two
trays. The second tray remained empty. Then, subjects waited in room 1 for
2min. Next, the E opened the doors connecting room 1with the trays placed
in locations C and D, and subjects could obtain the tool (Supplemental
Experimental Procedures). Two weeks after the encoding phase, subjects
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1441were presented with the memory assessment phase. Before subjects
entered the testing rooms, the E placed the tool in the exact same location
as 2 weeks earlier. Note that subjects did not witness this hiding-tool event.
Once subjects entered room 1, the E presented the seesaw task. After 40 s,
the E opened the doors connecting room 1 with locations C and D. Subjects
could then obtain the tool. Previous participation in experiment 1 and in
Martin-Ordas et al.’s study [21] was taken into account to distribute the sub-
jects into two groups: experimental group (n = 11) and control group (n = 10).
See the Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures, two figures, and one table and can be found with this article online
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.06.017.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the Danish National Research Foundation
(grant DNRF93). The authors wish to thank the ESF RNP ‘‘CompCog’’
(http://www.compcog.org) (06-RNP-020) for hosting the symposium on
Planning, Memory, and Mental Time Travel in 2011. The study was ethically
approved by an internal committee at the Max Planck Institute for
Evolutionary Anthropology (the joint ethics committee of the MPI-EVA and
the Zoo Leipzig).
Received: December 27, 2012
Revised: May 21, 2013
Accepted: June 6, 2013
Published: July 18, 2013
References
1. Tulving, E. (2005). Episodic memory and autonoesis: uniquely human?
In The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective
Consciousness, T.S. Herbert and J. Metcalfe, eds. (New York: Oxford
University Press), pp. 3–56.
2. Cheke, L.G., and Clayton, N.S. (2010). Mental time travel in animals.
WIREs Cogn. Sci. 1, 1–16.
3. Suddendorf, T., and Corballis, M.C. (2007). The evolution of foresight:
what is mental time travel, and is it unique to humans? Behav. Brain
Sci. 30, 299–313, discussion 313–351.
4. Babb, S.J., and Crystal, J.D. (2005). Discrimination of what, when and
where: implications for episodic-like memory in the rat. Learn. Motiv.
36, 177–189.
5. Clayton, N.S., and Dickinson, A. (1998). Episodic-like memory during
cache recovery by scrub jays. Nature 395, 272–274.
6. Martin-Ordas, G., Haun, D., Colmenares, F., and Call, J. (2010). Keeping
track of time: evidence for episodic-like memory in great apes. Anim.
Cogn. 13, 331–340.
7. Schwartz, B.L., Colon, M.R., Sanchez, I.C., Rodriguez, I.A., and Evans,
S. (2002). Single-trial learning of ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘who’’ information in a
gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla): implications for episodic memory. Anim.
Cogn. 5, 85–90.
8. Menzel, C.R. (1999). Unprompted recall and reporting of hidden objects
by a chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) after extended delays. J. Comp.
Psychol. 113, 426–434.
9. Menzel, C.R. (2005). Progress in the study of chimpanzee recall and
episodic memory. In The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of
Self-Reflective Consciousness, T.S. Herbert and J. Metcalfe, eds.
(New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 188–224.
10. Proust, M. (1932–1938). Pa˚ Sporet Efter Den Tabte Tid [A la Recherce du
Temps Perdu/Remembrance of Things Past]. (Copenhagen: Martins
Forlag).
11. Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of Episodic Memory (New York: Oxford
Univ. Press).
12. Rubin, C. (1986). Autobiographical Memory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
13. Conway, M.A., and Pleydell-Pearce, C.W. (2000). The construction of
autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychol. Rev.
107, 261–288.
14. Berntsen, D., Staugaard, S.R., and Sørensen, L.M. (2013). Why am I
remembering this now? Predicting the occurrence of involuntary
(spontaneous) episodic memories. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 142, 426–444.15. Mulcahy, N.J., Call, J., and Dunbar, R.I.M. (2005). Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla)
and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) encode relevant problem features in
a tool-using task. J. Comp. Psychol. 119, 23–32.
16. Girndt, A., Meier, T., and Call, J. (2008). Task constraints mask great
apes’ ability to solve the trap-table task. J. Exp. Psychol. Anim.
Behav. Process. 34, 54–62.
17. Martin-Ordas, G., Call, J., and Colmenares, F. (2008). Tubes, tables and
traps: great apes solve two functionally equivalent trap tasks but show
no evidence of transfer across tasks. Anim. Cogn. 11, 423–430.
18. Manrique, H.M., Gross, A.N., and Call, J. (2010). Great apes select tools
on the basis of their rigidity. J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 36,
409–422.
19. Barsalou, L.W. (1988). The content and organization of autobiographical
memories. In Remembering Reconsidered: Ecological and Traditional
Approaches to the Study of Memory, U. Neisser and E. Winograd,
eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 193–243.
20. Berntsen, D. (1996). Involuntary autobiographical memories. Appl.
Cogn. Psychol. 10, 435–454.
21. Martin-Ordas, G., Atance, C.M., and Call, J. (2013). Remembering in
tool-use tasks in children and apes: The role of the information at encod-
ing. Memory.
22. Eichenbaum, H. (1997). How does the brain organize memories?
Science 277, 330–332.
23. Newcombe, N.S., Lloyd, M.E., and Ratliff, K.R. (2007). Development of
episodic and autobiographical memory: a cognitive neuroscience
perspective. In Advances in Child Development and Behavior, Volume
35, R.V. Kail, ed. (San Diego: Elsevier), pp. 37–85.
24. Chalfonte, B.L., and Johnson, M.K. (1996). Feature memory and binding
in young and older adults. Mem. Cognit. 24, 403–416.
25. Crystal, J.D., Alford, W.T., Zhou, W., and Hohmann, A.G. (2013). Source
memory in the rat. Curr. Biol. 23, 387–391.
26. Zentall, T.R., Clement, T.S., Bhatt, R.S., and Allen, J. (2001). Episodic-
like memory in pigeons. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 8, 685–690.
27. Beran, M.J., Pate, J.L., Richardson, W.K., and Rumbaugh, D.M. (2000).
A chimpanzee’s (Pan troglodytes) long-term retention of lexigrams.
Anim. Learn. Behav. 28, 201–207.
28. Patterson, T.L., and Tzeng, O.J.L. (1979). Long-term memory for
abstract concepts in the lowland gorilla. Bull. Psychon. Soc. 13,
279–282.
29. Adachi, I., Anderson, J.R., and Fujita, K. (2011). Reverse-reward learning
in squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus): retesting after 5 years, and
assessment on qualitative transfer. J. Comp. Psychol. 125, 84–90.
30. Conway, M.A. (2009). Episodic memories. Neuropsychologia 47,
2305–2313.
31. Schlagman, S., and Kvavilashvili, L. (2008). Involuntary autobiographical
memories in and outside the laboratory: how different are they from
voluntary autobiographical memories? Mem. Cognit. 36, 920–932.
32. Donald, M. (1991). Origins of the Modern Mind. Three Stages in the
Evolution of Culture and Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press).
33. Berntsen, D. (2009). An Introduction to the Unbidden Past (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
34. Bluck, S. (2003). Autobiographical memory: exploring its functions in
everyday life. Memory 11, 113–123.
35. Pillemer, D.B. (2001). Momentous events and the life story. Rev. Gen.
Psychol. 5, 123–134.
36. Pillemer, D.B. (2003). Directive functions of autobiographical memory:
the guiding power of the specific episode. Memory 11, 193–202.
